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NORMATIVE FAILURE IN BLACKBURN'S RULING PASSIONS PORTER 
INTRODUCTION 
In Ruling Passions, 1 Simon Blackburn advances an ethical theory that welds his quasi­
realism to a Humean-Smithean theory of moral sentiments. This paper concerns the latter 
Humean side of Blackburn's theory, specifically Blackburn's attempt to provide a 
normative ethical theory. This attempt largely involves getting over the tallest obstacle to 
any defender ofHume: the famous sensible knave problem. 
I have three tasks. My first task is to examine Hume's original formulation of, 
and reply to, the problem posed by the sensible knave.2 This task includes a treatment of 
a prima facie circularity problem in Hume's picture, which may be soluble with regard to 
the original sensible knave, but insoluble with regard to a variation or descendant of the 
sensible knave. 
My second task is to examine the knave-related contemporary controversy 
between Blackburn and Christine Korsgaard. Blackburn's defense ofHume's reply to 
the knave consists primarily in his repudiation of criticisms leveled against Humean 
theories by Korsgaard in The Sources ofNormativity.3 I will defend Korsgaard's 
argument that Humean theories cannot be normative because they fail to fulfill her 
requirement oftransparency.4 
Since I leave open the matter of whether Korsgaard's transparency requirement is 
itself a legitimate requirement on an ethical theory-I offer no arguments in support of 
it-my third and final task is to show that Blackburn's theory fails to be normative even 
when the transparency requirement is suspended or rejected. I will be assisted again in 
this last discussion by Korsgaard. 
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NORMATIVE FAILURE IN BLACKBURN'S RULING PASSIONS PORTER 
HUME: INTRODUCING THE KNAVE 
In the discussion that precedes the appearance of the knave in the 2nd Enquiry Hume 
takes up the issue of our "interested obligation" to virtue (E 282). As Korsgaard says, 
Hume must overcome the worry "that morality might be bad or unhealthy for us" (SN 
61). Morality should not be able to tell us what to do, unless it can tell us to do what is 
good for us. So Hume tries to show that from the point ofview of self-interest, it is good 
for you to be a person who acts from motives approved by the moral sense.5 
The problem the knave poses concerns the virtue ofjustice. As Postema6 points 
out, this is because the knave suspects that the demands ofmorality and self-interest are 
not congruent in the case of the artificial virtue ofjustice. Noone can entertain knavish 
doubts about the natural virtues, on the other hand, because possessing those virtues (wit, 
for example) is its own reward, and thus exercising the natural virtues promotes self­
interest.? Justice, however, is another matter. On Hume's view, it is the system of 
justice that tends to promote the interests of society and individuals; and as societies 
expand, the benefits we receive from acting justly become less immediate. Moreover, 
justice occasionally requires a sacrifice of private or public interest.8 Such sacrifices 
cannot be motivated by a regard to immediate self-interest or benevolence, because they 
do not serve immediate self-interest or benevolence; and so in these cases the only 
normative standpoint available for motivating acts ofjustice is the standpoint ofmorality 
itself. 
The difficulty should by now be clear: Hume must show that it is in our interest to 
be persons motivated by a sense ofjustice, even when being such persons may compel 
sacrifices ofour interests. The knave throws the question directly back in Hume's face: 
2
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NORMATIVE FAILURE IN BLACKBURN'S RULING PASSIONS PORTER 
You say that we would endorse being a goodpersonfrom the point ofview ofself­
interest-well, what about in my case? Features of the knave's case require a special 
answer for this question. 
Hume describes the character of the sensible knave in the following passage: 
...a sensible knave, in particular incidents, may think, that an act of iniquity or infidelity 
will make a considerable addition to his fortune, without causing any considerable breach 
in the social union and confederacy (E 282). 
The knave is a free-rider: he keeps the laws ofjustice when lawfulness serves his 
reputation, and breaks them in such "particular incidents" as do not return ill 
consequences-when a violation harms neither his self-interest nor the "social union." 
This is the kind of problem that is virtually insurmountable for a voluntarist­
contractarian theory such as Hobbes's, in which the moral authority of the sovereign rests 
in his power to punish violators of the law: when violations such as the knave's go 
undiscovered and unpunished, it seems the sovereign has no authority. Thus we cannot 
say to the knave that he should perform the just action since otherwise the king will have 
him beheaded (cf. SN29-30). Saying this is not only theoretically tenuous-in the 
knave's case, it is not even persuasive, as the knave's example clearly stipulates that the 
king, or whoever, will know nothing of the offense. 
The knave threatens the authority of a Humean theory as well, although for a 
different reason. If, as Hume contends, the good ofjustice derives from its general 
tendency to promote good (by securing property), then it seems the knave has no reason 
not to flout the demands ofjustice, given the proper opportunity; it may be that we 
surrender to the knave as soon as we admit even that there are exceptions to the general 
rule. By a perfectly accomplished piece of knavery, the knave hopes for the best of both 
3
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NORMATIVE FAILURE IN BLACKBURN'S RULING PASSIONS PORTER 
worlds, promoting his self-interest by the injustice, but without undermining the system 
ofjustice itself, nor the considerable interest he has in the continuance of that system. 
Hume allows that there may be no correcting the knave: 
If his heart rebel not against such pernicious maxims, if he feel no reluctance to the 
thoughts of villainy or baseness, he has indeed lost a considerable motive to virtue...(E 
283). 
However, Hume has available several responses. Postema offers a helpful survey of 
them. Drawing from A Treatise ofHuman Nature as well as from the 2nd Enquiry, 
Postema lays out "three related lines of argument in reply to the sensible knave." Here 
are the fIrst two,9 which, for Postema, are most easily dismissed: 
(l) First. Hume maintains that because actions in such a practice [justice] are intricately 
linked, and success depends not simply on one's own action but on the coordinated 
actions ofall the other members of the community, it is reasonable to believe that every 
violation of the rules genuinely threatens the survival of the system and thereby of 
society. 
(2) Such exceptions [to the rules ofjustice as the exception proposed by the knave, 
Hume] insists, are permissible only if they can be formulated into a general rule and 
incorporated into the system ofjustice (HR 30-31). 
Item (l) fInds Hume denying that there are exceptions and holding that every act 
of injustice threatens the system ofjustice. Here, though, "Hume has overstated his case" 
(HR 31), Postema says. It appears simply false to claim that society cannot withstand a 
single act of injustice; society does withstand, quite often, the most severe acts of 
injustice, and "it has a great capacity to rebound from violations of even its most 
fundamental and widely shared principles" (Ibid). 
Item (2) fails to address the knave properly. The knave does not propose to 
replace the rules ofjustice with rules ofhis own; rather, "his argument is consistent with 
the conviction that, as a set of general rules for general compliance, the existing rules are 
the best conceivable" (Ibid.). The knave has no quarrel with the rules; furthennore, he 
knows (because he is a "sensible" knave) that ifhe wants to go on being a knave, he had 
4
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better obey these rules most of the time. His complaint is not to propose new rules of 
justice; it proposes an exception to rules he is generally willing to observe. (Remember 
this point. It will resound later against Blackburn.) 
The third of Hume's replies is more sophisticated, and it is related to the first. 
Postema lists three conditions that would have to be met in order for the claim in 
(l}-that violations of the rules ofjustice threaten the whole system ofjustice-to be 
true: 
(3.1) The actions of parties to the convention [ofjustice] are tightly locked in patterns of 
interdependence such that what each does depends greatly on what everyone else can be 
expected to do. 
(3.2) The conventions are quasi-unstable, that is, while no party may prefer to deviate, 
given the confonnity ofall the others to the rules, nevertheless, deviation is preferred in 
the absence ofsufficient assurance ofgeneral confonnity. 
(3.3) Violations ofthe rules of the convention are publicly detectable (HR 33). 
The result of these three conditions is that the knave will have to keep his knavery secret, 
even while carefully maintaining the public appearance of being just. More 
perspicuously: the knave will endeavor to overturn condition (3.3), because it is the only 
one of these three conditions that lies directly under his control (cf. HR 33). 
Postema says that Hume may argue that this strategy of meticulously guarded 
secrecy will prove disastrous for the knave. The knave will end up alienated at the core; 
in concealing a central principle of his life from his community, he cuts himself off from 
the community and so cuts himselfoff from himself. Since, in Hume's psychology, we 
identitY ourselves by recognizing how others see us, the knave will have destroyed 
himself: he cannot see himself in others, because others do not see what he is.10 
Postema chases Hume on this point through several twists and turns, and I do not 
have space for them here, so I will have to close my discussion ofPostema's survey by 
observing this: after saying that he has reduced Hume's defenses to one last reply, 
5
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Postema suggests that that last reply is implausible. He has beaten back Hume on several 
fronts, but ultimately arrives at only a well-fortified skepticism about Hume's reply to the 
knave. I think Postema's arguments do yet allow that if Hume's claim (implausible, but 
merely implausible) that the knave "loses his character with himself' holds, then Hume's 
reply to the knave succeeds. 
KNAVB ONE, KNAVB Two, AND THE CIRCULARITY PROBLEM 
This section continues my first task, examining some complications in our picture. I am 
preparing to show how Christine Korsgaard raises more serious problems for Hume, for 
she argues that Hume's theory fails even if it can show that the knave loses his 
character-and even if the knave gives in to duty and performs the just action in the 
exceptional case, when acting unjustly would benefit him without harming the system of 
justice. 
I will present Korsgaard's arguments in the next section. In this section I will say 
a little more to show why they are needed. An apparent circularity problem can be 
solved with regard to the original knave; with regard to a variation of the knave, the 
circularity problem may be insoluble. As we will see, Korsgaard's arguments are 
remarkable because they threaten Hume's position regardless of the outcome of the 
circularity problem. 
A kind of circularity "appears at first sight" (SN 59) to threaten Hume here. You 
may suspect that Hume's reply to the knave is circular if you take Hume to be saying that 
we should not be unjust because we disapprove of injustice. If this were really what 
Hume is saying, he would be begging the question, because such a response evades the 
6
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compelling possibility that the knave is simply not concerned with being just (although 
he may be so concerned, as Postema shows us). "Of course integrity will be cherished 
by honest people who feel the importance of it. But the sensible knave is questioning 
exactly that importance" (Ibid.). 
Korsgaard explicitly allows that Hume's mechanism of sympathy can ensure that 
the knave act virtuously, despite his inclinations to the contrary and despite even his 
knowing that his transgression would go unnoticed. Sympathy imagines and imports, so 
to speak, the sentiments of others to bear on our deliberations; likewise sympathy enables 
the knave to imagine what the sentiments of others would be ifthey knew ofthe knave's 
transgression. II Thus, as Korsgaard says, 
...the fact that other people will disapprove and dislike the sensible knave will be 
sufficient to provide him with feelings ofdisapproval and dislike ofhimself. Of course a 
knave will try to keep his knavish actions secret. But unless he is very hardened indeed, 
even the knowledge that others would hate him if they knew what he is up to will be 
enough to produce humility and self-hatred when he acts unjustly...So Hume's reply to 
the sensible knave is not circular (Ibid). 
Postema also notes several points in Hume's discussion at which Hume appears to 
beg the question. Recall that Postema's three conditions on Hume's first line of 
argument against the knave (which I've labeled {3.1-3.3}) give the result that the knave 
will have to keep his actions secret. A knave especially bent on knavery might well 
know that, and remind us that "knavery is not for everyone" (HR 34); the appearance of 
being just, the knave might say, accomplishes everything that the reality of being just 
would accomplish. So-and this is consistent with Korsgaard-if our knave is 
extraordinarily recalcitrant, he may not be motivated by the disapproving sentiments that 
infect him, preferring, after all, to keep his secrets. It is because the knave might press 
7
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the dispute this far that Hume is forced to argue that such secrecy itselfis destructive of 
the knave's character (cf. HR 34-35). 
Hume's reply to the knave would be circular if, as we might think "at first sight," 
there is no way ofgetting into the knave's head a sentiment that disapproves of injustice; 
if the knave is once and for all a person who cannot "feel the importance" ofjustice, it 
will beg the question to respond to him as though he does feel that importance. However, 
Hume's mechanism of sympathy can ensure that the knave will be visited by such a 
sentiment: the knave will internalize the sentiments of others who do disapprove of 
injustice, and so feel humility on that account. Moreover, as Korsgaard reminds us, 
Hume requires that we judge in sympathy with an agent's "narrow circle" (those people 
most immediately and frequently affected by the agent's conduct) and according to 
general rules. This requirement "brings a kind of objectivity" to the sentiments of others; 
there is a "convergence of sentiments" (SN 55). When the knave internalizes the gaze of 
others, he internalizes a sentiment that disapproves of injustice univocally. 
For Blackburn, the solution to the problem ends here: if the knave's sympathetic 
apparatus is operating properly-and it should, insofar as he is a "sensible" knave-then 
he will be provided, under sufficient societal pressures, with motivations for doing the 
right thing, however grudgingly. Ifit turns out that this kind of reluctant virtue marks the 
regular pattern of his behavior, then we have the best that may be hoped for in his case, 
and we may be inclined to redouble our efforts to educate our fellows toward a genuine 
love of virtue. Perhaps we might even use the knave as an example to the young: 
wouldn't it be easier for him, we could say, ifhe enjoyed being so law-abiding? 
8
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Blackburn distinguishes two kinds of sensible knave, and is far more alarmed by 
the threat posed by the second. Henceforth I will refer to the original knave as "Knave 
One," and to Blackburn's second knave as "Knave Two." Blackburn notes the example 
of Rousseau's Spartans, who kept a strong society among themselves but dealt with their 
neighbors by violence, treachery, and deceit. He calls this "Foreign-Office variety" of 
the knave-Knave Two-the "less tractable" and "unfortunately also more common" 
problem (RP 211). 
Postema shows us that Knave Two could be the evil descendant of Knave One: 
The present argument [Hume's] does not show that it is in the knave's interest to follow 
the dictates ofjustice in those cases in which injustice will be undetected and the victims 
are sufficiently psychologically (or socially) distant. This is a serious problem for Hume. 
For the special attraction ofjustice is its promise to extend the patterns of cooperation 
typical ofthe close circle ofthe family to larger and less personal social contexts in 
which natural relations of trust and close contact are weakened. Now it appears that 
justice can be shown to be rational only if the circle ofpersons to whom justice is owed 
does not extend very far beyond the circle of family and friends (BR 36). 
Humility may stop Knave One short of acting unjustly when the injustice harms people 
with whom he strongly sympathizes. Ifhe then turns his opportunistic injustice against 
distant victims with whom he does not strongly sympathize, he transforms into Knave 
Two. 12 
On Hume's theory, we enter a system ofjustice by modeling, in ever-wider scope, 
the kind of familial cooperation into which we are born. This system of cooperation will 
serve our interests much in the way that family members help each other in primitive or 
tribal settings-and I don't intend to speak pejoratively here, since such settings can be 
hypothetical (cf. HR 25-26). We extend the system ofjustice, because it promises to 
promote our interests-and we do this by extending our sympathy, creating a broader and 
broader community.13 
9
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So one hopes, at any rate. But now Knave Two threatens to send the whole 
process into retreat. We may supply Knave One with a motivation toward justice by 
infecting him with feelings ofhumility; but what if the proposed piece of knavery, Knave 
Two's, involves making victims of distant strangers, with whom neither the knave nor his 
community sympathizes strongly? History's darkest tales often involve men made 
famous by just this sort of knavery-take the Spanish conquistadors, for instance-who 
may have been virtually impervious to sentiments sympathetic to their victims. For 
knaves like these, sympathy may be too weak, with regard to their victims, to be active. 
Circularity may indeed by ineradicable in the case of Knave Two, because not even 
Korsgaard's counterfactual sentiments can come to the rescue as they did in the case of 
Knave One: a conquistador in a community ofother conquistadors, proposing to murder 
and rob an Aztec emperor, could not feel humility by considering what others would 
think of the action-most likely, the others would approve it. 
Ifone thinks, as Blackburn seems to think, that the problem begins and ends with 
the technical challenge of sneaking a sympathetic sentiment into the knave's head, then 
Knave Two will indeed pose the less tractable-and possibly the intractable-circularity 
problem. This line of thinking also explains why the fmal chapter of Ruling Passions, in 
which Blackburn purports to address the issue of authority, is primarily an extended 
repudiation of ethical relativism. Knave Two raises the spectre of ethical relativism, 
because his example suggests that, should two antagonistic societies full of Knaves Two 
come into conflict (as in, say, the horrific Rwandan genocide), there will be no normative 
ground to stand on in resolving the dispute. 
10
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We turn now to Korsgaard, because she, alone among these philosophers, argues 
that nonnative problems still haunt the case of the sensible knave--ofwhichever 
variety---even ifhe can be instilled by sympathy with the proper sentiments. The 
problem of moral authority is a much more intimate problem than the macrosocial 
problems ofethical relativism; and the knave of the domestic variety poses a problem less 
tractable than Blackburn supposes. 
KORSGAARD'S TRANSPARENCY REQUIREMENT 
I move now to my second task: a discussion of the contemporary knave-related 
controversy involving Korsgaard and Blackburn. 
The following arguments from Korsgaard apply whether or not the knave is 
infected by sympathetic sentiments. If the knave never even acquires such sentiments (as 
Knave Two may not), then Hume's project dies before Korsgaard can kill it. If the knave 
does acquire such sentiments (as we suppose Knave One will, at least), Korsgaard can 
show that moral authority still remains at risk. This is why these arguments are 
devastating for Blackburn's treatment of the sensible knave. 
According to Korsgaard, a nonnative ethical theory must meet a requirement of 
transparency: that is to say, the application of a moral theory must survive the agent's 
knowledge of that theory. Ifknowing the truth about morality would destroy the agent's 
motivation to be moral, such a morality cannot be nonnative, because the agent cannot in 
this case act morally without believing that her morality is unjustified Blackburn's 
failure to meet the challenges presented by Korsgaard is due largely to the fact that his 
11
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responses seem to ignore the transparency requirement, and without arguing for its 
illegitimacy.14 
To make the pertinence of the transparency requirement to our considerations 
especially clear, Korsgaard asks us to imagine "a slightly more attractive version of 
Hume's sensible knave": 
Our knave is the lawyer for a rich client who has recently died, leaving his money to 
medical research. In going through the client's papers the lawyer discovers a will of 
more recent date, made without the lawyer's help but in due form, leaving the money 
instead to the client's worthless nephew, who will spend it all on beer and comic books 
(SN86). 
What adds to the fun is that our lawyer "is also a student ofHume, and believes the 
theory of the virtues that we fmd in A Treatise ofHuman Nature" (SN 88). This feature 
makes our case a dramatic test of the transparency requirement: our agent is fully aware 
of the nature of the morality that guides her deliberation, and we must see whether she 
will feel justified if she does the right thing. 
It turns out that our lawyer will not have such a feeling ofjustification. For, as a 
student ofHume, she knows not only that she would disapprove ofherself if she executed 
the invalid will, but also why she would disapprove ofherself: because the kind of deceit 
involved in executing invalid wills has the general tendency to harm the social order. In 
this case, however, her deceit would have no harmful effects; in fact, we should say that 
it would have very helpful effects. As Korsgaard says, 
The lawyer believes that her disapproval ofthis action [executing the invalid will] 
depends on the fact that actions ofthis kind usually have bad effects which this one does 
not have. It is almost inconceivable that believing this will have no effect on her 
disapproval itself (SN 87). 
IfHume is right, the lawyer may fmd that she cannot destroy a valid will without intense 
feelings of humility or self-hatred. These mayor may not be strong enough to cause her 
to desist. But even ifthey are there will have been normative failure. The lawyer does 
not believe that the claims her moral feelings make on her in this case are well-grounded. 
If she could cure herself of them then that is what she would do (SN 88). 
12 
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Blackburn offers a response to Korsgaard's Humean lawyer, but it is inadequate. 
He begins with a few contemning remarks characterizing the scenario as a "magical" 
case, one from "philosophical fairyland" (RP 233 and 235, respectively): any real lawyer, 
in the real world, would face innumerable complexities that this scenario must, as a mere 
sketch, exclude. 
These remarks should be ignored; they simply dodge the point. Hume himself 
posited the problem of the sensible knave, and so we should expect a defender of Hume 
to do better than to hand-wave away the very epistemological condition that makes the 
problem so interesting and difficult. The epistemological condition is that the knave 
knows that a particular unjust action will bring consequences utilitarianly preferable to 
those promised by the just action that is its alternative-and ofall the scenarios 
answering to this condition, Korsgaard's seems most charitable for its being rather 
notably unmagical. 15 
Ignoring, then, Blackburn's fIrst criticism of the Humean lawyer, we should look 
at his more mannered and thoughtful response, which attempts to refute Korsgaard's 
contention that the lawyer would rid herself of her "moral feelings" if she could. I have 
placed "moral feelings" in quotation marks because of the sly inaccuracy of the following 
(notice where I have added emphasis to Blackburn's text): 
So the key question is why the Humean lawyer should wish she could cure herself of her 
disposition to hate injustice-the disposition that is causing her to hate it even in this 
case, where the injustice will do good. We might have found this question difficult had 
we not been through the discussion ofthe previous chapters....Among the motivational 
states Hume would approve in a lawyer will be the desire to act as her role demands; 
respect for the wishes ofthe deceased; and the pride or at least peace of mind that comes 
of acting only in ways that stand up to public scrutiny (RP 234). 
In the next section, I will examine the "discussion ofthe previous chapters" to which 
Blackburn alludes in this passage; we will see that it has problems of its own. 
13 
•
 
NORMATIVE FAILURE IN BLACKBURN'S RULING PASSIONS PORTER 
In the meantime, we should notice that what Blackburn says here is mostly 
correct, as far as it goes: the Humean lawyer, properly speaking, will not wish to cure 
herself of her disposition to hate injustice, because, as a good student ofHume, she 
knows that this disposition generally serves public and private interest. But this is not, as 
Blackburn says, the "key question." 
That's because saying "disposition" where Korsgaard quite meaningfully does 
not-she says "moral feelings"-is a crucial mistake. Blackburn is right: the Humean 
lawyer will not wish to cure herself ofher disposition to hate injustice. What she will 
wish to be rid of, rather, is the operation of this disposition in this particular case. This 
case is exceptional: features that uphold the general rule describing the operation of the 
disposition--the features that in most cases explain the tendency of the disposition to 
promote the societal good-are not present. And these are the very features that allow 
the lawyer to feel, in most cases, but not in this one, that the claims made on her by 
morality, or by her role, are justified. 
Recall Postema's second Humean reply to the knave: the argument that 
exceptions are impermissible unless they can be assimilated to a general system of rules. 
Postema points out in that argument a mistake similar to the one I point out here: just as 
the knave does not challenge the existing rules, and indeed allows that they may be the 
"best conceivable," the Humean lawyer does not wish to change her disposition to hate 
injustice. This is another reply that fails to address the knave properly. 
Korsgaard in fact anticipates Blackburn's answer, because Hume made the same 
answer. In her discussion of the lawyer-knave, Korsgaard tells us what is wrong with it: 
Hume has a defence against this point, but it is a defence of the wrong kind. Consider 
once more the original sensible knave. What does he lose by his knavery? According to 
Hume, he loses his character with himself, his pleasing sense of self-worth... [and] this 
14 
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does not depend on his moral beliefs, or on whether he endorses the claims of morality. 
Since sympathy makes him see himself through the eyes ofothers, this will happen 
anyway. But this is exactly the problem (SN 87). 
The "problem" is that although the knave's knavish actions may cause him to feel 
humility, he will not feel that this humility is justified, because nothing in the case 
recommends a virtuous action for the regular reason or according to the general rule. 
Moreover, even if the knave could be moved by sympathy, most or some of the time, to 
perform the virtuous action, he (or she, in the case of the lawyer) would still lack a 
feeling ofjustification. Korsgaard here completes the criticism that Postema was 
unwilling to pursue further: even if, as suggested by Hume's third line of reply, the knave 
will lose his character with himself, he will feel that this "loss of his soul" is ill-grounded. 
This lack ofjustification is what Korsgaard calls "normative failure," and it poses a threat 
that Blackburn's theory cannot surmount so long as the transparency requirement stands. 
NORMATIVITY, PRIVACY, AND BLACKBURN'S A PRIORI PRINCIPLE OF INTERPRETATION 
We turn now my third and final task, and to ''the discussion of the previous chapters" to 
which Blackburn alludes above. What goes on in this discussion? How, exactly, does 
this discussion assist Blackburn's position-and does it? 
The discussion Blackburn has in mind concerns a case of his own, which he calls 
"structurally the same" (RP 235) as the case ofKorsgaard's lawyer-knave. The case is 
that ofa soccer referee who faces an opportunity to make a deceitful call that might bring 
certain desirable consequences-it might, say, benefit the home team and delight the 
home crowd ofa hundred thousand, a rowdy and devoted bunch ofhooligans who have 
been known to riot after a loss. The alleged structural similarity between the deliberative 
problems faced by the Humean lawyer and the soccer referee seems to be this: each is 
15
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weighing, against an ostensibly duty-bound alternative, an act ofdeceit that is 
utilitarianly preferable. The question for Blackburn, as a defender ofHume, is how to 
make room in his theory for the recommendation of the dutiful action, despite Hume's 
seemingly utilitarian leanings. 
Interestingly, Blackburn's first impulse in the treatment of the referee case is, as 
in the case of the lawyer, to sneeze at the epistemological conditions that defme the 
scenario. Just as Blackburn contends that the lawyer would not be so likely to know that 
the execution of the invalid will would bring happy consequences, he contends also that 
the referee would not be so likely to know just which false call would be the one 
utilitarianly worth making. The thrust of this point, then, seems to be that the referee 
ends up served best, even in utilitarian tenns, by somehow forgetting the possibility that a 
false call might please the crowd. Consider this passage from Blackburn, in which we 
might consider the Humean lawyer or the soccer referee as an example of a "participant," 
and professional law or refereeing, respectively, as an example ofan "institution": 
For what is to stop the participant from being alert to situations in which the general good 
is indeed furthered by his breaking a rule? Surely the very story we tell about the good 
generated by the institution must allow that there should be such cases, and that the 
participant would do better to exploit them. For, ex hypothesi, they are cases in which the 
good is furthered by the infringement. So we can have the general good plus the surplus 
good created by occasions ofdeparture from the rules...The mistake in this tempting line 
ofargument is in supposing that we can have the general good plus the surplus. The 
incoherence of this as a general recommendation is already apparent. For if it were 
generally known (for example) that referees were disposed to give false decisions when 
they judged that in that way the interests of the spectators and players would be better 
served, then, as we have seen, the entire structure collapses (RP 42). 
Here Blackburn is arguing that a consequentialist doctrine can to an extent determine the 
thoughts of genuine participants in a consequentialist institution. It can forbid certain 
considerations from the participant's deliberation; it can even-so Blackburn 
hopes-forbid the participant from deliberating as a consequentialist. But this approach 
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falls easy prey to the transparency requirement: it requires that our referee and our lawyer 
be unaware of the ends they would serve by performing their offices; a consequentialist 
institution that requires its participants not to deliberate as consequentialists is not a 
transparent institution. 
The result is that if, as Blackburn says, the cases of the Humean lawyer and the 
soccer referee really are structurally the same, then the latter falls prey to the same 
arguments from the transparency requirement that dissolve normativity in the former. If 
they share the same structure, they share the same defect. Referees and lawyers alike 
represent failures of Humean ethics so long as the transparency requirement stands. 
By the way: I think that the two cases are, in at least one important respect, not 
structurally similar, for the Humean lawyer considers a transgression that would be kept 
secret, while the referee considers a transgression that would take place before an 
audience of thousands. So much the worse for Blackburn: ifthe analogy is a good one, 
his arguments regarding the referee fail so long as we recognize the transparency 
requirement; and if the analogy is not a good one, then referee-related arguments can't be 
put into service in reply to the Humean lawyer. Blackburn's last hope, then, is that we 
ignore the transparency requirement. 
So in charity to Blackburn, let us suppose, however dubiously, that Korsgaard's 
transparency requirement is not a legitimate requirement on an ethical theory. Even so, I 
think Korsgaard would find Blackburn's theory unsatisfying in another way as well. To 
open this discussion, we should take broaden our discussion of ethical "roles" beyond just 
professions or offices, such as law and refereeing; we may now include regular 
behavioral patterns, or what Blackburn often calls "contingent profiles ofconcern." 
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According to Blackburn, these proftles come parceled with a normative dimension: an 
agent's pattern of behavior will allow us to "read back" from her actions her concerns, 
and those concerns in turn can tell us what that agent should do. 
Now, the concept of"concern"16 is rather narrow. For purposes of illustration, we 
can start more broadly, with desires. Let's suppose that you desire to eat an apple. I may 
learn about your desire to eat an apple by your engaging in any number ofcharacteristic 
behaviors-there is an apple nearby, say, that you've been eyeing intently for some time, 
or you've just said, "I really could go for an apple." Now, I can expect that you will eat 
an apple, and will be surprised ifyou do not eat an apple-this much is simple. 
Blackburn's view, though, makes the further step of describing my expectation as 
imparting (or at least belying) a normative dimension to our situation: my expecting that 
you will eat an apple amounts to my believing that you ought to eat one, or that your 
eating an apple would "make sense." There is thus, on this analysis, 
an assimilation of the nonnative and the causal order. We know what a desire is by 
knowing what it would make sense to do in the light of having that desire; but then we 
know whether someone has the desire by seeing if this light is one that makes good sense 
of what they [sic] do (RP 58). 
And all this holds for the narrower concept ofconcerns, as well. Over time, the prudent 
actions ofa prudent person inform us that she is concerned to be prudent, and so we may 
come to expect that she perform-and think, therefore, that she should perform-more 
prudent actions. 
Informing this model is what Blackburn calls the "a priori principle of 
interpretation," or API. Here is Blackburn's statement of this principle: 
It is analytic that creatures with beliefs, desires, and other states ofmind, behave in ways 
that (best) make sense (and not in ways that make no sense), given those states ofmind 
(RP 55). 
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It should be clear how such a principle delivers the above analysis of desires and 
concerns. Can the principle, though, have further implications for our discussion of the 
knave? We should consider API's bearing on the problem of the sensible knave, since 
API figures so prominently in the "discussion of the previous chapters" ofRuling 
Passions that furnishes-says Blackburn-an obvious and total repudiation of Korsgaard. 
One might suspect that API gives us a back door to moral authority by imposing 
what we could call "normatively narrow" psychologies on moral agents: psychologies 
that, specific to an agent's role or office, exclude certain considerations from the agent's 
moral deliberations so long as that agent may be accurately described as inhabiting that 
role or office. So, concerning our lawyer and our referee, we might be able to say 
something like this: so long as lawyers and referees are perfonning as lawyers and 
referees--and that is to say, as people concerned with being good lawyers and 
referees--they will perform as their offices require, and feel justified in doing so. 
Otherwise, they are just not performing as lawyers and referees; it is analytic that to 
perform as a referee is to perform according to certain rules. There are only so many 
mistakes one can make as a referee without forfeiting the name. As Blackburn says, 
Consider the example ofgame-playing. Here, too, there is a defmitive nonnative order: a 
game is defined by its rules. There is a limit to the extent to which people can fail to 
confonn to the rules. A rule may be broken now and again, but systematic and 
acknowledged breaking ofthe rules becomes not that, but a change of the game. Yet it is 
largely an empirical matter which game people are playing. Their behaviour tells us 
which patterns they do confonn to and that in turn tells us which game they are playing: 
that is, which are the rules to which they ought to confonn (RP 57-58). 
But on this approach, what regular behavioral proftle could fail to count as 
a role, station, or office? So far as I can tell, Blackburn nowhere in Ruling 
Passions addresses this problem: that API confuses our expectations ofagents 
(relative to their roles) with the normative demands we would make of them. 
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These are really not the same, but they cannot be distinguished under API, 
because although AP(may explain the way we expect other agents to act in 
accordance to their roles, it cannot render any judgments or offer any 
recommendations as to such roles themselves. You may, in certain cases, decide 
which action is best by considering your role, but you cannot decide which role is 
best by appealing to your role. Consider this example: 
Mr. X is a swinger. I7 He considers himself a ladies' man; the feeling of 
manliness he derives from swift and short sexual conquests is genuinely 
constitutive ofX's sense of identity: if a trusted friend asks him to deftne himself, 
he deftnes himself primarily as a user of women. Now, X's acquaintances may, 
given X's deplorable track record, expect X to spend next Saturday night, as so 
many before, at some nightclub, trying to beguile some luckless woman into 
sleeping with him. 
But-unless, as I suppose is plausible, these acquaintances share and 
endorse X's Bacchanalian tastes--we shouldn't think that these expectations are 
necessarily to be identifted with what X's acquaintances think X ought to do. The 
word ought has no place here: we don't speak ofphilanderers as if they ought to 
philander, just because doing so is their habit. We say rather that they ought to 
throw over that role entirely.18 
Korsgaard, I think, would reject Blackburn's claim that there is an 
"assimilation of the normative and the causal order." Our inability to distinguish 
the two under Blackburn's account is precisely what disturbs us in the case ofMr. 
X: we don't want to give in to the thought that X's relationship to his role as a 
20 
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philanderer is a causal relationship; we want to say, rather, that he can disobey the 
"demands" ofhis role'and reform himself. If we are especially evangelistic, then 
for the sake ofX's immortal soul, we insist on that. 
In the fourth lecture of The Sources ofNormativity, Korsgaard 
demonstrates the importance ofa distinction between the normative and the 
causal through a treatment ofWittgenstein's private language argument. 
Wittgenstein proved that there cannot be a "private" language, a language which 
cannot logically be understood, except by its only speaker. Wittgenstein's 
argument proceeds by reductio ad absurdum; he begins by imagining what an 
allegedly private language would be like, and presents the following scenario. 
Your private language consists ofyour naming a sensation whenever it 
occurs. You can't call it by the name ofany familiar sensation, because in that 
case you would be able to communicate it to us, and your language wouldn't be 
private. Instead, you call the sensation "S." 
Wittgenstein argued that there couldn't be any such language. One way to understand his 
argument goes like this: meaning is relational because it is a normative notion: to say that 
X means Y is to say that one ought to take X for Y; and this requires two, a legislator to 
lay it down and a citizen to obey. And the relation between these two is not merely 
causal because the citizen can disobey: there must be a possibility ofmisunderstanding or 
mistake (SN 137). 
There must be a possibility ofmisunderstanding or mistake, because, as 
Wittgenstein has it, there can be no possibility ofcorrectness without the 
possibility of incorrectness. Consider what happens when you name your 
sensation "s" for the first time. As Wittgenstein writes, 
this process [ofnaming the sensation'S'] brings it about that I remember the connection 
right in the future. But in the present case I have no criterion ofcorrectness. One would 
like to say: whatever is goin~ to seem right to me is right. And that only means that here 
we cannot talk about 'right.' 9 
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Since that first decision could not have been incorrect-you could have given the 
name "s" to any sensation-it could not have been correct, either. Correctness 
requires the possibility of incorrectness; language requires both possibilities, and 
thus there can be no private language. 
According to K.orsgaard, ''we can make a parallel argument against private 
reasons: reasons are relational because reason is a normative notion: to say that R 
is a reason for A is to say that one should do A because ofR: and this requires 
two, a legislator to lay it down and a citizen to obey" (SN 138).20 Blackburn's 
case, as we have it, imputes to moral agents just the sort of"private reasons" that 
are under attack here. What an agent ought to do is to be settled by an appeal to 
the nature of that agent's role or profile ofconcern. But the profile of concern 
bears a causal relationship to the action, and so what ought to be done is 
isomorphic with what is expected to be done. 
The problem with this approach is much like the problem you face when 
you privately name a sensation "S": there is no possibility of a mistake. And yet 
there must be a possibility ofa mistake: surely we can abandon our roles if we 
wish; and surely we should abandon our roles when it is right to do so. Since API 
will describe your behavior as "making sense" (given your profile ofconcern) no 
matter what you do, it "cannot talk about 'right. '" API interprets every action of 
every agent as "making sense"; thus obedience and disobedience to your role 
"make sense" alike-and thus the interpretation is otiose. 
CONCLUSION 
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I have present~ two lines ofargument along which Korsgaard can successfully 
defend from Blackburn's criticism her general thesis that Humean moral theories 
fail to provide a source ofnormativity.21 
If the transparency requirement stands as a legitimate requirement on an 
ethical theory, then a Humean theory fails in the case of the knave. Even if the 
sensible knave can be motivated by counterfactual sentiments-thoughts ofwhat 
others would think ofhim ifhe were to do the unjust action----he would still 
suspect that his duty-motivated action was unjustified. Such an example 
illustrates what Korsgaard calls "normative failure": to fulfill the transparency 
requirement, an agent must be able to act in the light offull knowledge of 
morality and feel justified in doing so. 
Ifthe transparency requirement is suspended or rejected, Blackburn's 
theory still fails to provide a source ofnormativity. It cannot provide a source of 
normativity because it is founded in a principle, API, that presumes the 
isomorphism ofthe normative and the causal. Korsgaard's deployment of 
Wittgenstein's private language argument shows that normativity cannot survive a 
complete alignment with causality. API fails, then, to provide any normativity 
because it cannot describe role-playing agents as making any mistakes. 
I think these two analyses are most illuminating when considered as an 
interdependent pair; in a sense, Blackburn's theory fails because it seems not to 
recognize the relatedness of these points. In the end, it is perverse that Blackburn 
asks us to remember API in support ofhis response to the soccer referee, because 
API holds that "there is an assimilation ofthe normative and the causal order." 
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But it is precisely because this is not the case that the referee and the Humean 
lawyer and 'the sensible knave pose compelling normative problems. If there were 
truly an assimilation of the normative and the causal order, then a referee would 
stand in a causal relationship to his role; the role would cause him to do things, 
and we would not have to wonder about whether he should choose to break a rule. 
API is not a governing principle; if it were, there would be no role-inhabiting 
sensible knaves at all. The relationship between an agent and her reasons for 
action, role-related or otherwise, can be normative only insofar as it is not merely 
causal. 
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